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Das Wichtigste in Kürze

Introduction
There is a long controversy on whether resale price maintenance (RPM) should be legal. Although it is established that RPM facilitates collusion, 1 the US Supreme Court overturned the long standing per-se illegality of minimum RPM with the Leegin decision of 2007.
2 Courts now have to judge minimum RPM under the rule of reason. In the EU, minimum and fixed RPM are still core restrictions of competition, but the guidelines now specify when minimum RPM may be legal.
3
The dominant efficiency defense both in Leegin and the European guidelines are service incentives: A manufacturer uses minimum RPM to provide retailers with the appropriate incentives for useful services that would be under-provided under price competition. Examples include shopping time reduction (Winter, 1993) , quality certification (Marvel and McCafferty, 1984) and sales advice (Telser, 1960) . These models focus on a single manufacturer, although we often observe minimum RPM at retailers carrying many brands of products such as books, clothing, contact lenses, hearing devices and household appliances.
4 Retailers of such products frequently offer services such as pre-sales advice and product positioning. Interestingly, several observers have stated that the established service arguments often do not apply in RPM cases. 5 Note that when retailers carry products of several manufacturers, a single manufacturer should have little incentives to use minimum RPM to finance retail services which benefit all manufacturers.
In this paper, we rationalize that minimum RPM may be used by competing manufacturers to divert retail services even when the overall service level of retailers cannot be affected. Note that for a fixed overall level of services, retailers should have incentives to allocate sales services more to those products on which they earn the highest margins. For example, the sales agent of a retailer, when approached by a consumer for sales advice, has to decide which product to present to the consumer. Although matching the consumers with on average less suitable products decreases overall sales, high retail margins on actual sales can outweigh this loss. In turn, each manufacturer has an incentive to use 1 See Marvel and McCafferty, 1984; Jullien and Rey, 2007; Rey and Verge, 2010 . RPM can also be used by a manufacturer to exclude more efficient rivals (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2011 and references therein Pitofsky (1984) , SCHERER and ROSS (1990), pp. 551-552, and Klein (2009) . Grimes (2009) minimum RPM to ensure high retail margins on its products and thereby increase their sales.
We set up a model with two symmetric manufacturers who sell through two common and symmetric retailers. The retailers allocate services among the products. First, we hold each retailer's overall service level fixed and assume that manufacturers do not compete directly for consumers, but only indirectly for favorable retail services. We show that if retail price competition is strong, each manufacturer fixes a minimum price to induce favorable services. This occurs even when only linear tariffs are feasible, so that a manufacturer cannot extract retail rents with a franchise fee.
Service is allocated evenly in equilibrium, just as without RPM. The retail prices are higher because with minimum RPM a manufacturer directly controls the retail margin and thus can incentivize favorable services without lowering its wholesale price. This exercise illustrates that minimum RPM may be used to boost sales services even though, by construction, the overall service level cannot increase.
Although total industry profits increase with minimum RPM, direct control can collectively hurt the manufacturers because competition for favorable services intensifies. Indeed, with linear wholesale tariffs and linear demand, minimum RPM implies a reduction in manufacturers' profits and benefits retailers. Nevertheless, manufacturers have individual incentives to use minimum RPM, which implies a prisoner's dilemma. On the contrary, maximum RPM -which manufacturers use if retail price competition is weak -increases both the manufacturer profits and consumer surplus, but decreases the retail profits.
In a second step, we allow each retailer to initially invest in the level of its matching services. Investing more yields more precise information about which product suits which consumer. Conventional wisdom suggests that if retailers need to invest in services, the service level should be higher because minimum RPM increases the retail margins. Contrarily, although sales are more profitable for a retailer, we find that equilibrium service investments are lower with minimum RPM. The reason is that retailers have ex-ante incentives to be uninformed about consumer preferences over the products, as this makes products more exchangeable from the retailers' perspective. Being more exchangeable induces the manufacturers to compete harder for favorable services and thus to offer more attractive tariffs to the retailers. With RPM, manufacturers compete more directly for favorable services. Thus retailers have stronger incentives to be uninformed when RPM is used, and invest less in matching precision.
In a third step, we allow for asymmetry by introducing a third manufacturer who offers a perfect substitute to one of the other manufacturers' products. As a consequence, only one manufacturer has market power, and only this manufacturer can effectively use RPM. The resulting asymmetric use of RPM tends to increase the asymmetry in margins and thus services. If retailers are close substitutes, consumers are inefficiently often matched with the high priced product. A ban on RPM can reduce this distortion.
Competition policy has to distinguish between cases in which externalities yield an insufficient level of retail services and cases in which the service level is sufficient or even better without RPM. The danger is that competition policy relies too much on the established service arguments with a single manufacturer, which suggest that minimum RPM increases efficiency. Within our model, raising retail margins of only one product through minimum RPM indeed induces retailers to allocate more services to that product.
Hence a manufacturer can demonstrate that minimum RPM is effective in increasing services for its product. However, if our model applies, minimum RPM does not induce any efficiency gains in equilibrium, but increases retail prices and can even decrease the quality of service. For example, in the Leegin case competing manufacturers of women apparel sold through common retailers. Elzinga and Mills (2009) Elzinga and Mills (2009) even emphasize the role of sales associates in the retailing of specialty apparel.
6 With this paper, we contribute a theory of how minimum RPM, when used to increase sales services, can hurt all consumers -and even the manufacturers.
Related literature
This paper is related to the literature on service and RPM in the context of a single manufacturer. These arguments are based on positive service externalities. A retailer fails to take into account the positive effects of its services on the manufacturer's profits (Winter, 1993) . Moreover, each retailer provides too little service if other retailers benefit from these services (Telser, 1960) . A single manufacturer can mitigate these coordination failures by imposing RPM. It is acknowledged that a manufacturer optimizes services with respect to marginal consumers (Schulz, 2007) . Nevertheless, it is often argued that the single manufacturer's interest with respect to margins and services of exclusive retailers are broadly aligned with the interests of an average consumer and thus total surplus. For a recent discussion see Winter (2009) . 7 We depart from the single manufacturer assumption and focus on the case of common retailers. Our understanding that retailers can steer demand to more profitable products is related to the literature on product advice. Raskovich (2007) considers a setting with two manufacturers and a single retailer who provides product (existence) information. Raskovich assumes that manufacturers fully control retail margins, i.e., use RPM. Manufacturers compete in margins since the retailer has an incentive to inform consumers about high margin products rather than low margin products. He concludes that matching competition clauses may dampen competition. In Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) , consumers 6 Elzinga and Mills (2009) 7 Several articles study RPM in the context of spillovers in case of stock-outs (Deneckere et al., 1997 (Deneckere et al., , 1996 Krishnan and Winter, 2007; Wang, 2004) . Wang actually has two manufacturers, but competitive exclusive retailers and finds that total surplus increases with RPM.
shop for an experience good and have to rely on a single adviser. The adviser offers two products of two different firms and is paid by the firms through sales commissions. The firms compete in sales commissions to influence the advice and thereby boost demand. Inderst and Ottaviani find that commissions are higher when they are not disclosed, but that disclosure may lead to an inefficiently small market share of the more efficient product provider. As the adviser cannot set the retail prices, their setting is similar to our case where firms use RPM.
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These articles share with our paper that the matching advice offered by a retailer to customers is influenced by the products' profitabilities. However, these articles do not consider price competition between retailers and the incentives of a manufacturer to relax this competition by using RPM. The core of the present paper is the analysis of competing manufacturers' individual incentives to use RPM and the effects of RPM compared to a situation in which RPM is not feasible.
We are aware of two articles that also analyze RPM in a setting with differentiated manufacturers and common retailers, but neither considers service. Rey and Verge (2010) show that the monopolization result of Bernheim and Whinston (1985) with a common retailer and two-part tariffs offered by manufacturers can be extended to competing common retailers if manufacturers can use RPM. Their result relies on efficient two-part tariffs.
9 In addition, they point out that with two-part tariffs, common agency equilibria often fail to exist. Dobson and Waterson (2007) 
Framework
Two symmetric, differentiated, single-product manufacturers (i = A, B) sell their products to two symmetric, differentiated retailers (k = 1, 2). Retailers provide product specific services such as pre-sale advice. Services are non-contractible. We first assume that the overall service level, e.g., the number and skill of sales personnel used to advise consumers, is exogenous. Investments in the overall service level are endogenized in 8 Moreover, Armstrong and Zhou (2011) show how a retailer affects the prominence of search goods. Dziuda (2011) shows that a biased expert can use strategic argumentation to mislead clients searching for the best match. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009a,b) analyze over-selling of a single product when retailers provide multiple services and biased advice with only one strategic producer and two products, respectively.
9 Efficient means that rents can be extracted through up-front fees without a loss. 10 Cf. Dobson and Waterson (2007) , fn. 26. Subsection 4.1. For a fixed overall service level, we analyze how service is allocated to the products on offer. All costs of manufacturing and retailing are normalized to zero in this case.
11 We assume that more service allocated to product i increases the demand for this product at both retailers. For a fixed overall service level, more service allocated to product i implies a reduction in the service and thus demand for the other product, called −i. In particular, each retailer chooses s k ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of services allocated to product
A. If the retailer favors product A (B), s k is greater (smaller) than 1 /2; s k = 1 /2 implies that retailer k's service is evenly distributed. We assume that the allocation of services to products affects the maximal demand for each product at both retailers. M i is the maximal demand for product i and depends on the service allocations of both retailers. Assume that demand for product i at retailer k is twice continuously differentiable and has the functional form
This demand structure allows us to separate the pricing of products from the service decisions. Demand for product i only depends on the prices for that product at each retailer, but not on the prices of the other manufacturer's product. Thus, there is no direct price competition between the manufacturers. This ensures that manufacturers' strategic delegation of pricing to retailers à la Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995) does not drive our results. We occasionally suppress the arguments when it is without loss of clarity and impose
Assumption 1. M i is strictly concave with
and symmetric around 1 /2:
12
The concavity and symmetry of M i (s 1 , s 2 ) imply that allocating services unevenly to the two products reduces the aggregate M A + M B .
13 The service choice s k affects demand only through M i . Hence, s 1 and s 2 affect both retailers symmetrically. This serves tractability, as does
Assumption 2. There are no cross effects between retailers' service allocations, in par-
Moreover, demand for a product decreases when all its retail prices increase:
Once service investments are endogenous the retailer must of course anticipate whether investment costs can be recovered.
12 Strict concavity is convenient but our results are also valid as long as aM i + bM −i is strictly quasiconcave for a, b > 0 and s 1 , s 2 ∈ (0, 1). Strict quasi-concavity follows naturally from our micro foundation in Appendix B.
13 The following assumptions on derivatives apply strictly only for the relevant range where
. This derivative is zero at s k = 0.5. By strict concavity, this is the unique maximizer.
As we assume service to be product specific, it is a form of special services discussed by Telser (1960) . For example, retailers may provide information to consumers about the existence of the two products; each consumer only values one of the products and has limited patience. Naturally, each retailer has an incentive to first present the product which the consumer actually likes. If the retailer cannot say with certainty which product the consumer prefers, the retailer has to base its decision on an estimate of the probability that the consumer likes product A, and not B. When selling product A yields the same retail profit as selling product B, the retailer will always first present the product that is more likely to be valued by the consumer. Instead, if the products have different profitabilities, the retailer will more often present the product with the higher profitability.
In Appendix B, we provide a more formal exposition of this example of sales services, derive the properties of the demand function, and motivate the technical assumptions. Similar to Mathewson and Winter (1984) , we assume that consumers are ex-ante not informed about the products, but know a product's retail prices once they are informed about it.
We are interested in the competitive effects of allowing the two manufacturers to control retail prices. Two regimes are considered:
RPM is not enforceable by any manufacturer,
(ii) RPM can be enforced by each manufacturer.
If manufacturer i restricts the retail price to p i , it must be maintained by both retailers.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Each manufacturer i ∈ {A, B} sets a uniform wholesale price w i , and optionally fixes p i under regime (ii).
2. Each retailer k ∈ {1, 2} observes all the prices set by manufacturers, chooses the service allocation s k , and sets its own retail prices
Demand is realized.
Linear wholesale tariffs provide a clear-cut benchmark in which incentivizing retailers is costly for the manufacturers. Other things equal, imposing minimum RPM when additional rents can be extracted using up-front fees makes minimum RPM even more attractive. Moreover, with linear tariffs we avoid non-existence problems as in Rey and Verge (2010) . Nevertheless, the logic of our arguments extends to non-linear contracts as well, see Subsection 5.1. The profit of manufacturer i is given by
and the profit of retailer k by
To ensure that there is a unique equilibrium in the retailers' pricing game, we impose that the Hessian matrix of d i,k has a negative and dominant main diagonal.
Assumption 4.
Now, we solve the game for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, first without and then with RPM. We begin with a brief discussion of a simple benchmark case with exogenous service allocations.
A benchmark with exogenous service allocations
Suppose for the moment that s 1 and s 2 are exogenous. As we assume that there is no direct price competition between the products A and B, each manufacturer thus becomes an upstream monopolist facing two retailers under imperfect competition. Let superscript N denote equilibrium prices without RPM. Without RPM, a double marginalization problem arises because the retail price p N lies above the monopoly price
which maximizes industry profits. Manufacturers have no reason to incentivize retailers through positive margins as they cannot influence sales and a retailer's outside option is zero. Each manufacturer will consequently set its wholesale price equal to the monopoly price and use a price ceiling to squeeze the retail margin to zero, i.e., w
where superscript R denotes equilibrium prices with RPM.
In what follows, we assume that retailers can steer demand by using the service instruments s k , k ∈ {1, 2}. Thus the product demands become interdependent and manufacturers have to compete for favorable retail services.
Equilibrium without resale price maintenance (regime (i))
Assume that manufacturers can only set wholesale prices, but that no manufacturer can use RPM. For given wholesale prices, each retailer chooses p A,k , p B,k and s k to maximize Π k . We first solve for retail prices and service allocations of the retail subgame. The first order condition (FOC) is
Note that (5) is independent of s 1 and s 2 as well as of the wholesale and retail prices of product −i. Denote by p * i (w i ) the equilibrium retail price for product i and by
its corresponding retail profitability. Weak concavity and the dominance of own price effects of d i,k (Assumption 4) imply that the pass through ∂p * i /∂w i is below one. Hence ϕ * i decreases with w i .
Differentiating Π k with respect to s k yields the FOC Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A.
We can now turn to stage 1. To simplify notation, let
Taking the retailer continuation equilibrium into account, a manufacturer's demand in stage 1 is given by
facing a tradeoff between price and quantity. An increase in w i increases the own margin, but decreases demand in two ways: First, the retail price increases so that some of the consumers attracted by services do not buy the product. Second, the retail profitability decreases so that retailers allocate services away and thus attract fewer consumers to the product as we show below.
We derive the effect of w i on M i at symmetric wholesale prices w N by differentiating the retailer's FOC (6) for s k and evaluating it at
where
The parameter λ is derived by collecting the effects of a change in w i through s k and s −k on M i at symmetric wholesale prices w A = w B . The first factor of λ measures the relative shift in mass when s k is marginally changed at the point of symmetry. The second factor measures the curvature of M i at this point. The higher the second derivative is in absolute value, the more total mass is lost for a given shift. Thus, λ measures the substitutability of the products as perceived by the retailers when they allocate services. The larger λ is, the more substitutable the products are, and the less total mass is lost for a given shift. The mass M i decreases more in the wholesale price w i , the larger λ is. This is because a retailer's opportunity costs of shifting demand decrease in λ such that its reaction to a change in the relative profitabilities of the products becomes stronger. Substituting for (8) into the manufacturer's FOC implied by (7) and applying
with all derivatives evaluated at prices of w N and p N . The retail price is characterized by
In what follows, we restrict attention to demand functions that give rise to quasi-concave reduced-form manufacturer profits and a stable equilibrium such that implicit differentiation of the manufacturer FOCs can be applied. Intuitively, the more substitutable products are for a retailer, i.e., the higher λ is, the more a retailer reallocates services in response to an increased profitability of a product. For λ = 0, products are not substitutable and the equilibrium is that of the benchmark case in Section 3.2 where M i is exogenous and a manufacturer acts as an upstream monopolist. As λ increases, manufacturer competition for favorable retail services drives wholesale prices towards zero and increases the retailers' profits.
Equilibrium with resale price maintenance (regime (ii))
In this subsection we first argue that if RPM is enforceable, both manufacturers will use it. Recall from Proposition 1 that if no manufacturer can use RPM, the equilibrium prices are w • increasing w i increases its own margin, but decreases the retail margin p i − w i and thus induces retailers to allocate services away from that product;
• increasing p i increases the retail margin and thus retailers allocate more services to product i. Yet a higher p i implies that an attracted consumer is less likely to buy the product.
Given the two instruments (w i , p i ), it is optimal for the manufacturer to enforce the industry profit maximizing retail price p M . This price does not depend on the prices of the other product because there is no direct price competition between manufacturers. The economic intuition behind Lemma 2 is that the manufacturer can use RPM to maximize the joint rent from selling its product, and can use the wholesale price to control the retail margin and thus service incentives. Without RPM, the manufacturer can only use the wholesale price to control both retail incentives and overall profitability. Since it is a manufacturer's dominant strategy to use RPM and set the retail price at the monopoly level, both manufacturers will do so in any equilibrium in which both use RPM. The optimal wholesale price depends on the other product's retail profitability as this influences the service incentives. Focusing again on demands that give rise to interior solutions, yields Proposition 2. In the unique and symmetric equilibrium with RPM,
Service is allocated evenly and the retail margin increases in λ.
17 Otherwise, the retail price would be a function of the competitor's retail price; see Subsection 5.2 for this extension.
Having characterized the equilibrium prices and service decisions under both regimes, we now compare them to evaluate the effects of RPM on profits and welfare. 
Competitive effects of resale price maintenance
λ > λ M ≡ −∂ d i,k (p M , p M ) ∂ p i,k / ∂ d i,k (p M , p M ) ∂ p i,−k − 1.(13)
Correspondingly, RPM decreases retail prices if and only if the above inequality is reversed. For
The right hand side of (13) measures the intensity of retail competition. It is positive as the own price effect dominates the cross price effect by Assumption 3. The left hand side of (13) contains λ, the substitutability of products for the retailers and thus measures manufacturer competition for services. With RPM, the retail price always equals p M , whereas without RPM, the retail price decreases both in the intensities of manufacturer and retail competition. There is a critical level of λ, which we call λ M , such that for a given intensity of retail price competition, the retail prices with and without RPM are equal. If competition at both levels is sufficiently intense, the price level without RPM is lower than the industry profit maximizing price level p M , which results under RPM.
An important further question is whether minimum and maximum RPM can be distinguished with respect to their effects on retail prices and total surplus. We model RPM as price fixing. However, if RPM imposes a binding constraint on retailers, it acts either as a price floor or a price ceiling. For a given wholesale price, it is straightforward that minimum RPM increases retail prices while maximum RPM decreases prices. However, both wholesale and retail prices depend on whether RPM is used.
Minimum and maximum RPM can nevertheless be disentangled by answering the question: Does a retailer benefit from reducing or from increasing its price relative to the price imposed by the manufacturer? By evaluating a retailer's marginal profit with respect to its retail prices at the equilibrium values {w R , p R }, we obtain
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, manufacturers use minimum RPM if and only if
λ > λ M .
Manufacturers use maximum RPM if and only if
λ < λ M .
Corollary 1. Compared to the regime without RPM, minimum RPM always increases retail prices and maximum RPM always decreases retail prices. The equilibrium allocation of services is not affected by RPM.
To see why using minimum RPM is equivalent to an increase in the retail price, note that at λ = λ M , Lemma 4 implies p * (w R ) = p M , as no retailer has an incentive to deviate, whereas Lemma 3 implies p
is strictly increasing in w. Without RPM, by an envelope argument, a marginal increase in w i above w N = w R has no effect on the overall profitability of product i, as
Thus, locally, a change in the wholesale price w i boils down to a tradeoff between the manufacturer margin and the mass of demand M i , which depends on the retail profitability. This is the same tradeoff a manufacturer faces when fixing p i = p M and setting w i . Hence at λ = λ M , the equilibria with and without RPM coincide and RPM is a superfluous instrument. When raising λ above λ M , the wholesale prices both with and without RPM decrease (Propositions 1 and 2). In turn, RPM implies a price floor because each retailer individually prefers to set a price below p M . Analogously, for λ < λ M , wholesale prices increase and maximum RPM restricts the retail price to p M because retailers individually prefer to raise prices further. Corollary 1 suggests a simple optimal policy which is to forbid minimum RPM as it unambiguously increases retail prices and leaves services unchanged. By construction, symmetric increases in the retail profitabilities have no welfare effect as they do not affect the overall service level that we have kept exogenous so far. This result provides a clear benchmark that minimum RPM is harmful if the retail service level for this product category is socially sufficient without RPM. In order to investigate the effects of RPM on service efforts, we allow for service investments in the next subsection.
Are manufacturers better off when minimum RPM is enforceable? Recall that a unilateral introduction of RPM is always weakly profitable for a manufacturer as it yields direct control over the retail margin (Lemma 2). However, this additional control induces manufacturers to compete harder for retail services. Collectively, manufacturers can thus be worse off, even if industry profits increase through RPM. The next lemma defines this case.
Lemma 5. The enforceability of RPM imposes a prisoner's dilemma on manufacturers when the equilibrium profit of a manufacturer under the regime (ii) with enforceable RPM is lower than under the regime (i) without RPM. This is equivalent to w
The inequality in Lemma 5 is independent of M i because M i is the same in any symmetric equilibrium. For the case of minimum RPM we have established that p R > p N (Corollary 1); because d i,k decreases when both prices increase,
Thus a sufficient condition for minimum RPM to lead to a prisoner's dilemma is w R ≤ w N ,
i.e, that the manufacturer margin is weakly lower. Unfortunately, with only implicit definitions of w R and w N , it is difficult to establish general conditions for w R ≤ w N . In the next result, we use a linear parametrization of d i,k to obtain
Proposition 3. If demand is linear in prices, banning minimum RPM is both in the interest of consumers and manufacturers, whereas maximum RPM benefits these parties. For retailers, the reverse holds.
Without RPM, each manufacturer incentivizes retailers to divert services by reducing the wholesale price. However, retailers partially pass the price reduction on to consumers. This effect dampens manufacturer competition for the services of retailers. By contrast, if manufacturers use minimum RPM, retailers cannot pass on the wholesale price reduction. Hence manufacturers compete more directly and thus more fiercely, yielding lower wholesale prices with RPM. For linear demand, using minimum RPM is collectively never in the interest of manufacturers.
A caveat applies as this result is derived for linear wholesale tariffs; with two-part tariffs, the manufacturer can generally extract retail rents with an upfront-payment. Yet with two-part tariffs, the manufacturer must ensure that the retailer prefers carrying its product over exclusively carrying the other product. This tradeoff and thus the retailer's outside option to carrying the product generally depend on whether RPM is used in the industry, hence it is an open question whether the dilemma ceases to exist. We further elaborate on non-linear tariffs in Subsection 5.1.
Extensions
Investments in service quality
For a fixed overall service level, as assumed so far, a natural measure of a retailer's service quality is the mass of consumers that is successfully matched by the retailer,
The equilibrium service quality does not depend on whether RPM is enforceable because the service allocations are always undistorted in equilibrium (s * k = 1 /2). Conventional wisdom suggests that minimum RPM incentivizes retailers to invest more in service. We provide a counter example in which investment incentives of retailers are reduced when manufacturers use minimum RPM.
Consider that retail service consists of providing information about the existence of the products to consumers. Each consumer values only one of the products A and B. Consumers are impatient: if the retailer first presents them with the product they do not value, they do not buy any product. The retailer does not perfectly know which product a consumer prefers. This micro-foundation is consistent with the demand function (1) used in the main part.
In this subsection, we additionally allow the retailer to invest in obtaining better information on consumer preferences. For example, the retailer can train the sales agents to be better informed about the products so that they know which product fits a given consumer's needs. Formally, each retailer's information is expressed by a posterior probability q that a given consumer values product B and not A. Investment in information affects the distribution of q, which we further specify below. We assume that retailers' investments take place in an initial stage and become public information before manufacturers set prices. This assumption implies that manufacturers can change prices more easily than retailer can change the service level.
In what follows, we show that retailers invest less in service when manufacturers can use RPM than when manufacturers cannot use RPM. The reason is that the more a retailer invests, the better it is informed about each consumer's preferences and the less substitutable the products are when the retailer decides which product to present to a given consumer.
Let us establish this argument more formally. The probability q that a consumer values product B is distributed with G over [0, 1] . The information precision is captured by the size of the mass points α k /2 at 0 and 1. Assume that the mass of each consumer type at each retailer is one; hence α k represents the share of consumers of each type for which the retailer knows the preferred product with certainty. To parametrize G, we additionally assume that q is uniformly distributed in the interior (0, 1). The parameter α k is thus the overall service level of a retailer: The higher α k is, the better a retailer can match consumers to products. The mass of consumers successfully matched to product A as a function of service levels and allocations is given by
The service allocation s k is the cut-off probability such that for higher q the consumer is allocated to product B instead of A. See Appendix B for a derivation of (14). Note that M i increases in α 1 and α 2 as the last term of (14) 
with ∂λ/∂α k < 0. The arguments of λ are suppressed from now on.
The equilibrium prices (with or without RPM) are denoted by w l (λ) and p l (λ) with l = R, N . Each retailer solves
where C(α k ) denotes the investment costs as a function of the overall service level. We assume that C increases in α k with C (0) = 0 and C (1) = ∞ and is sufficiently convex to ensure unique solutions.
Let us now inspect the tradeoffs a retailer faces when choosing α k : More precise information on consumer types increase M i and thus profits. As λ decreases in α k , the wholesale prices increase with more precise information, both with and without RPM. Thus even without investment costs, the retailer faces a tradeoff: Better information increases successful matches and so demand, but it also decreases the retail profits earned on each consumer as the equilibrium wholesale prices increase. By investing less in precision, a retailer commits to perceive the products of the manufacturers as more substitutable, which invites the manufacturers to compete harder.
In order to compare the equilibrium quality levels with and without RPM, we use that q is uniformly distributed in (0, 1) Intuitively, recall that the wholesale prices and hence retail profits depend on λ, which measures the degree of substitutability of the products. The more substitutable the products are, the higher is the retailer margin. By being less informed, the retailer chooses a higher λ (more substitutability) and invites manufacturer competition. With RPM, each manufacturer can directly control its product's retail profitability by fixing the retail margin and can therefore respond more effectively to a change in λ. Hence, with RPM a higher λ is more valuable for a retailer. As λ decreases in α k , i.e. when the retailer is more informed, each retailer invests less in information precision under RPM.
Asymmetric market power and resale price maintenance
Symmetric manufacturers and retailers are a useful benchmark to assess the effects of RPM on prices and service levels. Moreover, it is insightful to consider manufacturers with different degrees of market power. We find that in such cases RPM tends to further distort the allocation of services.
Consider that there is one manufacturer of product A as before, but that now there are two manufacturers of product B. Assume that a retailer's allocation of service on product B cannot be manufacturer specific as the products are identical. In our leading example, this means that consumers who are informed about product B may buy the product of either manufacturer of B. If RPM is ruled out, all three manufacturers only set wholesale prices in the first stage. Bertrand competition between the manufacturers of product B forces wholesale prices to zero. This implies a retail price of p * (0) for product B (Lemma 1). Manufacturer A earns positive profits by setting a positive wholesale price.
As the retail profitability decreases in a product's wholesale price (Lemma 1), retailers will steer demand to product B in equilibrium. Without RPM, retailers thus favor sales of the competitive product B.
Now assume that RPM is feasible. Interestingly, the manufacturers of product B cannot effectively use RPM. By contradiction, assume that both manufacturers offer tariffs with wholesale prices of zero and a fixed retail price unequal to p * (0), i.e., effectively use RPM. This cannot be an equilibrium as a manufacturer of product B could profitably offer a contract with a slightly positive wholesale price and let retailers choose the price. Each retailer strictly prefers such an offer as it can play a best response to the other retailer.
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium, w B = 0 and p B,1 = p B,2 = p * (0). It is an equilibrium that each manufacturer of product B offers w B = 0 and does not fix the retail price.
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Lemma 6 implies that the competing manufacturers for product B cannot effectively use RPM. Hence the retail profitability on product B is not affected by the enforceability of RPM.
The profitability of product A generally depends on whether manufacturer A uses RPM. Faced with the same equilibrium prices on product B independent of whether RPM is feasible, manufacturer A is clearly (weakly) better off when fixing the retail price. With RPM, manufacturer A sets p A = p M to maximize the overall profitability on product A (Lemma 2) and sets w A by trading off the own margin and retailers' service incentives.
To understand the effects of RPM on prices and service allocations, consider two polar cases: retail monopolies and fierce competition (i.e., very small retail margins). In case of retail monopolies, the retail profitability is maximal on product B and strictly smaller on product A as w A > w B = 0 and p A = p B = p M . Thus service is (still) excessively allocated to product B, although excessive double marginalization on product A is eliminated. By contrast, fierce retail competition implies that the profitability on product B is low and, therefore, manufacturer A uses RPM to raise the retail margin and thereby profitability of A over that of B. Hence service is allocated more to product A in equilibrium. In this case, RPM raises the price level of product A and yields that services are allocated excessively to the more expensive product.
Proposition 5. Assume that two manufacturers sell product B and one manufacturer sells product A. If RPM is not enforceable, service is allocated more to product B than to the more expensive product A. If RPM is enforceable and retailers are close substitutes, product A is more expensive than product B and services are allocated more to product A.
The case with fierce retail competition and enforceable RPM exhibits that A is sold at a high, manufacturer-maintained price and is favorably sold by retailers, whereas product B is both less expensive and less endowed with services, e.g., is less advised or advertised. As an example for the asymmetry in manufacturer market powers, one could interpret A as a branded product and B as a private label which can be produced by several manufacturers. Interestingly, the price-service differential (high price & high service vs. low price & 20 Both manufacturers of B setting w B = 0 and fixing p B = p * (0) is not necessarily an equilibrium as one manufacturer could offer w B ≥ 0 and fix a much higher p B and possibly be accepted by both retailers. In any case, there is no equilibrium in strictly mixed strategies with RPM. low service) is not caused by different product qualities (vertical differentiation), but by asymmetric market power at the manufacturer level.
Discussion
In the previous section, we characterized the equilibria with and without RPM and derived our main results under simplifying assumptions. In this section, we discuss the consequences of allowing for non-linear upstream tariffs and direct price effects between the products.
Non-linear upstream tariffs
We face the usual modeling tradeoff between linear and two-part tariffs. Whereas linear tariffs are sometimes bilaterally inefficient within the model framework, the efficiency of two-part tariffs rests on implicit simplifying assumptions such as no input arbitrage and risk neutrality of retailers. Although it seems plausible that contracts involve non-linear components such as rebate schemes, we believe that linear tariffs are often more reasonable than fully efficient two-part tariffs.
By using linear tariffs, we also avoid to confound the service effects with the commonagency effects pointed out by Rey and Verge (2010) . These rely on two-part tariffs, as manufacturers need to become residual claimants of industry-profits. Our results with simple linear tariffs show that minimum RPM may even be used anti-competitively by manufacturers if more complex tariffs are not feasible.
Another reason for using linear tariffs is tractability. 21 In a symmetric equilibrium with common retailers and manufacturers offering unconditional two part tariffs, each retailer has to be indifferent between accepting one or both contracts, as otherwise each manufacturer could raise the upfront payment. Denoting the candidate contract by {w, F }, the indifference condition becomes
The left hand side contains the profit of a retailer when both retailers carry both products. The right hand side is the profit when the retailer only chooses one product, and retailers allocate services correspondingly. To break the indifference, a manufacturer can keep the upfront payment F and lower its marginal price w i slightly below w such that accepting only this manufacturer is strictly preferred by the retailer over accepting both. A marginal change thus induces a drastic reaction, which can destroy any candidate equilibrium. See Rey and Verge (2010) for a more detailed discussion on the non-existence of common agency equilibria in a similar setting. Conditional offers or menus of contracts may solve this problem. However, such an investigation is out of the scope of this paper.
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Nevertheless, focus we conjecture that our main results also hold with two-part tariffs. With two-part tariffs but without RPM, manufacturers can still not ensure high retail margins in case of strong retail competition. In turn, manufacturers have an incentive to reduce the wholesale margin in order to increase the retail profitability such that prices below the monopoly level may result. With RPM and two-part tariffs, providing marginal incentives is both feasible and costless as rents can be extracted via a fixed fee such that monopoly prices should be implemented.
Our result that RPM imposes a prisoner's dilemma relies on the assumption that a manufacturer cannot fully extract additional retail rents caused by RPM through twopart tariffs. However, note that in case of delegated agencies, also with two-part tariffs manufacturers must leave rents to retailers as a retailer can always opt to only carry one brand. A retailer's tradeoff between accepting one and both manufacturer's offers generally depends on whether RPM is employed. Thus RPM may impose a manufacturer dilemma even in case of fully efficient two-part tariffs.
Direct inter-brand price competition
The assumption of no cross price effects between products A and B simplified the previous exposition, but is certainly not always realistic. One way to relax this assumption is to assume that there is a fraction 1 − δ of uninformed consumers and a fraction δ of informed consumers.
An uninformed consumer only considers buying a product after being matched with that product by a retailer, giving rise to demand
as in the main part. Assume that informed consumers know their match values with both products, and that these values may both be positive. Hence the demand of an informed consumer, denoted by
, depends on all four prices, but not on service. Total demand is thus given by
A retailer's service allocation as a function of prices is still characterized by Equation (6) and thus remains unaffected. However, a retailer accounts for both h i,k and d i,k when deciding on a retail price p i,k and, therefore, considers the retail prices of product −i which affect h i,k . Similarly, a manufacturer now faces direct price competition through h i,k . The equilibrium prices are a convex combination of the equilibrium prices when all consumers are informed (δ = 1) and when all are uninformed (δ = 0). By continuity of the objective functions in δ, the results derived for δ = 0 in the main part remain qualitatively valid at least for a sufficiently small, but positive δ. Interestingly, another manufacturer dilemma may arise when the fraction of informed consumers δ is large. As δ → 1, the additional demand which can be generated with minimum RPM goes to zero. Instead, a manufacturer prefers maximum RPM to reduce the retail margin which increases demand through h i,k and d i,k . Maximum RPM is a manufacturer's dominant strategy in the present timing (cf. Subsection 3.4). However, committing not to control retail prices via RPM may increase profits as it can relax the manufacturers' competition: Without RPM on product A, the retailers may increase the price of product A in response to a cost increase of product B; such a reaction induces manufacturer B to set higher prices. See Bonanno and Vickers (1988) as well as Rey and Stiglitz (1995) who elaborate on strategic delegation of retail pricing in the context of exclusive retailers. Abstracting from direct price competition avoids to confound such effects with the effects of service competition.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of manufacturers to use RPM when they compete for sales services provided by common retailers. A manufacturer can use RPM to protect the retailers' margins on its products to induce favorable services. Holding the overall service level constant, we show that in equilibrium the competition of symmetric manufacturers for retail services yields minimum RPM and higher retail prices. If retailers can invest in the overall service level, we show that retailers may invest less if minimum RPM is used, although retail margins are higher. In consequence, all consumers, and even manufacturers, can be worse off.
Our model features two manufacturers and two common retailers, endogenous wholesale and retail prices, as well as endogenous service allocations and levels. As the analysis of such a setting is inherently complicated when all four agents behave strategically, we have imposed several simplifying assumptions. First, we have focused on linear wholesale tariffs to avoid complications such as the non-existence of an equilibrium pointed out by Rey and Verge (2010) . Second, we have not allowed for direct price competition between the competing products. Third, we have assumed that retailers contribute with their services to a common pool of consumers who are informed about the prices at both retailers. Although we have indicated that the assumptions can be relaxed without qualitatively changing the results, a full fledged analysis under alternative assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper, but appears promising for future research.
Service incentives are the major efficiency defense in favor of minimum RPM. In light of our results, we believe that competition policy relies too much on the established service arguments with a single manufacturer which -overall -suggest beneficial effects of minimum RPM. Similar arguments in favor of restricting retail price competition to ensure better consumer advice prevail in markets with complex products such as financial and health services. With this paper, we contribute a theory of how minimum RPM can hurt all consumers -and even manufacturers -in markets where manufacturers sell through common retailers who provide sales services.
Appendix A: Omitted proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. (1.) The FOC for the retail price is given by (5). The unique and symmetric equilibrium price p * i is defined by applying symmetry to (5). Implicit differentiation yields 0 <
(3.) From (1.), retail prices do not depend on s k . The equilibrium value s * k is defined by the FOC (6) evaluated at
Implicit differentiation of the definition of s * k yields
equals the sign of
. From (1.),
< 0 as the term in brackets is positive for i = A and negative for i = B.
(4.) w A = w B ≡ w implies equal retail price p * A = p * B and thus equal profitabilities
i.e. service is allocated evenly.
Proof of Proposition 1. Differentiating a manufacturer's profit π i from (7) with respect to w i yields the FOC
. Evaluating the FOC at w A = w B = w N , and correspondingly p A = p B = p N and s * k = 0.5∀k as well as dividing by 2 M i yields
Moreover, (16) simplifies to
. Quasi-concavity of π i (w i ) implies that the above condition characterizes the equilibrium wholesale price. Solving for w N and substituting for
to reduce (18) to (10). Note that (9) follows from symmetry in k. Product i's retail profitability decreases in w i by Lemma 1. To see that 
and, analogously, Substitute from (19) and (20) in (21) and (22). Note that any linear combination of the above FOC must be zero at the point of the optimal prices, hence yields the probability of a sale conditional on a correct match, which is given by
This demand formulation has the property that demand decreases when all prices increase, in particular 
Note that s k = 1 implies that the retailer informs all consumers about product A. In this context, λ as defined in (9) is a measure of information precision. Note that ) increases when the more informative q, i.e., those closer to zero and those closer to one are drawn more frequently.
27 For example, if the mass point α k increase and g is uniform in the interior, the density decreases everywhere in (0, 1).
